PRIVATE CRIMINAL REACH OF SECURITIES
REGULATION*

THE RECENT

case of Llanos v. United States' invites reflection on
the long reach of the federal criminal law into transactions involving
promissory notes. The defendants had devised a scheme whereby they
gave their own promissory notes to obtain money for their own use by
making various false representations about their business connections
and about the use to which the money was to be put. It was held that
these acts amounted to the "sale" of a "security," and the defendants
were convicted, inter alia, of fraud under the Securities Act of 1933.2
There is, of course, nothing novel in the determination that a
promissory note is a "security" 3 for the purpose of the Securities Act
and the state Blue Sky Laws, or that the issuing of such a note is a
"sale." 4 The Llanos case is, however, a strong reminder of the extent
to which the criminal sanctions of the Securities Act may be applicable
to even purely private transactions.
While private transactions are exempt from some provisions of the
Securities Act,5 they are not exempt from those defining and penalizing
*Llanos v. United States, 2o6 F.zd 852 ( 9 th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct.
310 (-954).
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fraud." True, most criminal prosecutions under these provisions have
involved dealings with the public,' but that feature is not an essential8
element of the statutory crime. Rather, there must only be a "sale"
of a "security," 9 in connection with which there is fraud" and the use
of interstate channels of communication." Further, under the Securi-

ties and Exchange Act of 19341 and Rule X-ioB-5 3 based thereon, 4
a purchaser as well as a seller 15 may be criminally liable for fraud'
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in connection with a security transaction. Again, the sanction is not
limited to public offerings, but may extend to a purely private deal
between individuals.17

A few illustrations suffice to point out the "private" reach of the
criminal sanctions under this legislation, which is commonly thought
of as dealing only with regulation of publicly held securities.
Example I: A, living in state X, telephones B in state Y, telling
B that he would like to buy B's Blackacre and that he will pay part
in cash and give his note for the balance. A falsely represents that he
is solvent. B conveys Blackacre and receives A's note. Under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, A is subject to criminal prosecution for this
private transaction, because all the requisite elements are present.
Example II: C, a jeweler, by letter to D, fraudulently represents
that he has a ring for sale which is a genuine diamond. D, living
outside of town, catches an interstate bus into town, and D, falsely
representing his solvency, purchases the ring from C by giving
a negotiable note. It is possible under the Exchange Act and Rule
X-ioB-5 that both C and D would be liable to criminal prosecution in
this private transaction because both have supplied all the requisite
elements, respectively, of the statutory crime.
Thus, it should be apparent that, although the purpose of the Sesurities Act and of the Securities and Exchange Act was ostensibly the
protection of the "public,""' their language is so broad that many
transactions, not ordinarily thought of as "security transactions," may
unexpectedly come within their purview.
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